with impersonal value are in some sense valuable for everyone, no matter their particular interests and circumstances, whereas things with personal value are in some sense peculiar to specific individuals. It would be unremarkable for anyone to value Niagara Falls precisely because of its awe-inspiring impact, whereas if just anyone valued my grandfather's ring precisely because it was my grandfather's, that might be cause for concern.
As intuitive as the distinction may initially seem, if it is to be more than just a gut assumption about the evaluative scope of different things, we need a more precise account of what makes impersonally valuable things relevant to everyone. People often disagree about what things are, or could be, impersonally valuable, and these theoretical disagreements are the source of conflicts with broad practical implications. After all, to claim that a given thing is, in some sense, valuable for everyone is to make a universal claim about the role that it should play in everyone's lives. 2 So, for instance, how and whether we ought to factor the natural environment into our practical decision making may be affected by whether the natural environment is impersonally valuable. If everyone has reason to value things that have impersonal value, then such things will make claims on our attention that those with merely personal value lack. Or consider evaluative claims about history and heritage. Some argue that the past should be valued as the common heritage of all humanity. Others argue that the value of cultural heritage is specific to the geographical, national, or ethnic groups with which it is most intimately connected. 3 Is the value of cultural heritage personal or impersonal? The answer will have substantial practical and moral consequences based on the role that such arguments play in conflicts over who has the right to possess, control, and profit from historically significant things. 4 To invoke a recent example, consider the battle over repatriation of artifacts from Machu
Picchu that were discovered, excavated, and brought to Yale University's Peabody Museum of Natural History over 100 years ago. Are Incan pottery shards objects of impersonal value that warrant the care and concern of all persons, and thus legitimize stewardship and study by preeminent archeologists and anthropologists, or even ownership by foreign entities? Or is this fetishistic robbery, more on a par with a stranger coveting my grandfather's ring?
The uncertainty stems from the fact that "valuable for everyone" is ambiguous among multiple interpretations. Are things with impersonal value valuable for everyone in the sense that everyone ought to value them? In the sense that everyone ought to at least respect such things, even if one does not value them oneself? 5 What kind of universality is at play here, and in what ways can valuable things secure it? My aim in this essay is to offer answers to these questions that will expand our theoretical resources for thinking about the scope of value and provide a better understanding of its importance to practical philosophy.
Part of my enterprise will be negative: I aim to raise doubts about the adequacy of certain analyses of impersonal value that might be thought to capture the intuitive universality canvassed at the outset. However, much of this essay will be devoted to painting a picture of what a more 4 These concerns are often captured with the provocative question "Who owns the past?" See, for instance, Kate Fitz Gibbon, ed. Who Owns the Past?, Rutgers Series on the Public Life of the Arts (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005). As the language of the question suggests, some approaches to answering it will be primarily legal or political in nature, focusing on issues of international law and sovereignty. I put those approaches aside here in order to focus on the relationship between persons and value of the objects in question, though I do briefly address issues of property and stewardship as they relate to value in the fourth section of the paper. 5 Moreover, who is "everyone?" Like many others writing on the topic of value, I assume that the scope of values ranges over the domain of valuers. So, something that is valuable "for everyone" is valuable for all valuers. However, as a reviewer helpfully noted, one might define the domain of valuers in different ways. Does it include all valuers that ever exist, or only those existing now? Does it include "marginal cases," or only full-blown rational agents? My sense of the literature is that valuers are often assumed to be rational agents who are sufficiently like "us," but this need not be the case. In fact, by stipulating different domains, one can investigate the different domain-specific scopes a valuable thing might have, and the approach that I argue for here can accommodate such stipulations. For the purposes of my discussion, however, I adopt the standard assumption.
comprehensive account of impersonal value might look like. That positive account will, however, have one further negative consequence: I aim to question the practical and theoretical importance of the traditional distinction between impersonal and personal value. Between my negative and positive accounts, I hope to show that the traditional distinction is at best inadequate, and at worst misleading, when it comes to our thinking about the scope of value.
I will first consider the view, which emerges from the work of Thomas Nagel, that the universality of impersonal value is secured by the fact that such value can be recognized from an impersonal perspective. 6 I suggest that the independence from particular perspectives is what makes impersonal value especially compelling on this account, calling for everyone to actively value things that possess it, which in turn makes this a plausible account of impersonal moral value (such as the importance of reducing suffering). However, both the independence from particular perspectives and the compelling force of impersonal value render this account inapt to capture the intuitive category of non-moral impersonal value (which is ostensibly possessed by such things as Niagara Falls, great works of art, and perhaps historical artifacts), which does not have the compelling force of moral value and whose importance is often best characterized from within particular perspectives. Given the inadequacy of these two approaches for understanding the range of ways in which values can achieve universality, we have good reason to seek a more comprehensive account. I argue that impersonal value is best understood in terms of everyone's having good (though not necessarily compelling) reason to value objects that possess it. For the purposes of this argument, I will assume that the objects under consideration are in fact valuable, and that the reasons to value them are the "right reasons," responsive to their particular value (as opposed to the threats of evil demons). 8 Moreover, having reason to value something should be distinguished from notions of permissibility. So while counting blades of grass on the lawn may in some sense be permissible, one does not have a relevant reason to do so, on the assumption that counting blades of grass is not a valuable activity.
By reflecting on the conditions that ground reasons to value, I develop an account of impersonal value that not only captures the difference between things with moral and non-moral value, but also accounts for the full range of reasons that persons can have for valuing a given thing. Importantly, I acknowledge that the achievement of impersonal value can be either monistic or pluralistic. In the first case, everyone has the same universal reason to value the same thing. In the second case, everyone is justified in valuing the same thing, but for two or more of a set of overlapping reasons. To the extent that these pluralistic reasons fail to overlap in a manner that covers all persons, we can chart the extent to which the evaluative scope of a given thing falls away from strict universality. This analysis provides conceptual resources that offer the potential for resolving disputes about objects of value caught between the traditional categories of personal and impersonal value, which forms an insufficiently nuanced dichotomy. 13 One might press on precisely what the relationship is supposed to be between (1) the fact that such value can be recognized from a detached perspective and (2) the further claim that it therefore has the motivating or compelling force that Nagel attributes to it. My interpretation is that, because we are reflecting from the impersonal perspective, there are no partial preferences or desires that might mitigate the force of this impersonal value and the reasons that relate to it (I discuss this interpretation further in section 3). For instance, later on in the same text, Nagel writes: "The actual acceptance of a general normative judgment will have motivational implications, for it will commit you under some circumstances to the acceptance of reasons to want and do things yourself. This is most clear when the objective judgment is that something has agent-neutral or impersonal value. That means anyone has reason to want it to happen-and that includes someone considering the world in detachment from the perspective of any particular person within it. Such a judgment has motivational content even before it is brought back down to the particular perspective of the individual who has accepted it objectively" (154-155). However, even if the relationship between (1) and (2) is shaky on Nagel's account, it suffices for my purposes here that Nagel holds both of these views. Even if he did not, the difference in compelling force between moral and non-moral impersonal value requires attention. we might call these reasons to engage with objects of value. 19 For example, a reason stemming from mere respect for value might be a reason not to interfere with someone else's valuable activity, say, bird watching, as we will discuss below. But non-interference hardly seems a way of engaging with bird watching: none of the purported goods of bird watching can be realized through non-interference alone in the way that they can through engagement with it (such as, for instance, participating in the activity of bird watching). Moving forward, I will thus sometimes use the term "engagement" to refer to the activities and attitudes distinctive of active valuing.
It is no wonder, then, that on Nagel's view, all things with impersonal value are intuitively those with moral value. On this account of impersonal value, not only are the reasons associated with impersonal value reasons of engagement, but they are also compelling reasons, ones that carry significant weight in practical reasoning. Putting aside the specter of moral relativism, it has seemed to many that justice, equality, autonomy, the absence of suffering, etc.
have value that is impersonal in this very sense: other things being equal, everyone ought to value them in the manner described in the Impersonal Perspective analysis (i.e. we ought to promote and prize them, and ensure that they play a substantive role in our evaluative and practical lives by being attentive to the reasons they give us). Indeed, the idea that things with moral value are those that everyone has compelling reason to value and engage with provides a plausible account of the force that moral value is typically thought to have.
However, there are two sources of concern with this account. First, while the impersonal perspective might secure the universal compelling engagement that is distinctive of moral value, this requirement may be uncalled for or inapt in the case of non-moral impersonal value.
Whatever may be universal about the value of Niagara Falls or the pyramids at Giza, it does not seem to compel us to value them in the way we are required to engage with objects of moral value.
their value can be recognized by abstracting away from all individual perspectives and adopting a "view from nowhere". 21 Rather, at least some artworks of universal value seem to possess the power to speak to each of us, not by riding roughshod over our individual differences, but by appealing to a multiplicity of particular perspectives. Beyond artistic examples, there are modes of valuing that make essential appeal to the personal perspective, such as sentimental valuing,
that cannot be captured from the impersonal perspective. This had led some philosophers to believe that sentimental value must be a kind of personal value. 22 Because sentimental valuing is a key mode of historical valuing, the linking of sentimental value and personal value has had misleading implications for how we think about the evaluative scope of cultural heritage, and the debate over its universal value. I return to this issue in more detail in the final section. For now, it suffices to note that the Impersonal Perspective analysis does not account for the possibility of universal value that in fact requires appeal to the personal perspective. 23 Impersonal value, in its universal sense, need not be impersonal in the perspectival sense.
With reference to the first concern, a number of philosophers have recognized a domain of things that possess non-moral value with an impersonal character (insofar as they seem to generate some universal reasons), but that do not require the engagement distinctive of the Impersonal Perspective approach: while these projects, activities, and objects intuitively generate some reasons for everyone, they are not the reasons of engagement involved in actively valuing 27 The Required Respect analysis is very similar to one that Scheffler considers in his discussion of the relationship between believing valuable and valuing, on which the claim that X is valuable "might be understood as the claim that X has properties in virtue of which (1) all people have reasons for behaving in certain (minimum) ways with regard to X, and (2) some people have reasons for additional actions with regard to X and for being emotionally vulnerable to it… valuable things give everyone, and not merely those who value them, certain minimal reasons for action, such as reasons not to destroy or denigrate those things." Scheffler, "Valuing," 36. Scheffler does not explicitly identify these general remarks about value as being about "impersonal value" per se, though he does distinguish his subject from both instrumental and personal value. The important idea for our purposes here is that Scheffler is identifying a kind of value such that it is in a particular sense a value for everyone. 30 There are of course important questions about the reasons one has for valuing some X and whether they might not be "the wrong kind of reasons," but this question at least assumes that the right kind of reasons are out there to be had. For the purposes of this paper, I am confining discussion to valuing for the right kind of reasons. we in fact value is a combination of the independent value of some X and the interest that we take in it, what we have reason to value is a combination of the independent value of some X and the conditions that warrant our taking an interest in it. 31 When we respect some valuable X but do not value it ourselves, the conditions that give us reason to value X might hold or they might 31 Compare Korsgaard's contribution to Raz et al., The Practice of Value. As R. Jay Wallace nicely summarizes her view in the introduction to that volume: "the standards that determine when and in what ways it would be appropriate to value a given object are specified not by social practices, but by the nature both of the object to be valued and of the person engaged in the activity of evaluative reflection" (8). I am less inclined to reject the relevance of social practices, but, as indicated above, I agree with the comprehensive approach (including both the subject and the object) to determining the standards that make valuing appropriate. 
Reason to Value
In order to construct such an account, we first must consider in greater detail the conditions that ground reasons for valuing things. The conditions canvassed here are meant to be a sketch; I don't assume that I have definitively established any list of necessary or sufficient conditions for having reason to value any given thing. My goal is to continue to motivate the idea that a wide variety of such conditions exist. Specifically, for the purposes of this paper, I desire only to show that understanding these conditions is essential to understanding the scope of value, which is in turn an indispensable aspect of understanding the practical significance of valuable things. If this is true, then it constitutes a clarion call for further research into the conditions that ground reasons to value.
There appears to be a diversity of ways in which reasons to value some X can be generated. One way arises in the case of bird watching considered above. I believe this analysis offers a number of considerations in its favor. We should first be careful to distinguish this account from the Impersonal Perspective analysis with which we began. As we observed, it seems to follow from the Impersonal Perspective account that things with impersonal value are those that everyone ought to value, where ought is understood in the sense of a requirement stemming from the presence of compelling reasons. This is why, as we noted, this analysis seems plausible for things with moral value, but because of reasonable assumptions about value pluralism, is problematic for things with non-moral value. In contrast, according to
Reason to Value, it would not be a requirement for everyone to value an impersonally valuable thing; one would merely have reason to do so. We thus have the resources for distinguishing the universality of moral value from the universality of non-moral value, and we avoid the counterintuitive implications that stem from collapsing them into a single category.
Second, this analysis gives respect for valuable things its properly broad scope. It allows that all rational agents ought to respect X simply in virtue of there being reason for some Y to value it, and not contingently upon X's being impersonally valuable. This affirms the public nature of reasons, and the plausible claim that any rational agent in the right epistemic situation should respect good reasons, even if they are completely beyond the pale of reasons that could apply to oneself.
Finally, and most importantly, this analysis can accommodate two different ways in which everyone might have reason to value X. The first we can call "monistic" universal reason.
This is the case when everyone has a reason to value X, and everyone has the same reason to value X. So, as considered above, features such as shared humanity, or rational agency, that generate reasons to value X will be monistic: everyone will have the same reason to value X.
However, this need not involve the abstraction to the impersonal, detached perspective advocated human independently of one's particular interests and circumstances, and those that apply simply because one is human among one's other particular interests and circumstances. In the former case, the independence from particular perspectives ensures the compelling force of the relevant reasons, and hence the requirement to engage with things that possess this kind of value. In the latter case, everyone might share the same reason in virtue of their shared humanity, but it is a reason the force of which is mitigated by the other features of one's personal perspective. So for instance, simply being human may be sufficient to ground reasons for valuing the history of our species or natural wonders, without giving us compelling reason to do so-we may have other interests and circumstances that render these things unimportant to us, despite our having reason to value them. So unlike Impersonal Perspective, Reason to Value makes room for valuable things that are a function of a common reason but do not have the compelling force of moral value. Though anyone may have reason to engage with these valuable things, it is not required.
We can call the second way in which everyone can have reason to value a given X "pluralistic" universal reason. This is the case when everyone has a reason to value X, but there is no single reason to value X that everyone shares in common. Rather, various relevant considerations generate different reasons for everyone to value the same X. This might be the case where, for instance, various forms of positional valuing overlap. 42 As we will see in the next section, the possibility of impersonal value that is a function of pluralistic universal reasons is key to removing the impasse created by the traditional distinction between impersonal and personal value. resources not only to account for those things whose value is universal, but also to guide productive inquiry into the more limited evaluative scope of other things whose value may not intuitively be understood as personal, but is not strictly universal either.
What we have seen so far is that the range of ways in which we might relate to some valuable X goes far beyond the simple dichotomy provided by the Impersonal Perspective and 42 This is similar to Wallace's claim that there is a "diversity of ways in which a common value can provide agents who are differently situated with different kinds of reasons." Wallace, "The Publicity of Reasons," 482. The difference is that Wallace's claim is about how a single shared value can provide different reasons for different people, whereas my claim here is that people can have different reasons to value the same thing. I believe that both claims are true. To the extent that these pluralistic reasons fail to overlap in a manner that covers all persons, we can chart the extent to which the value of X falls away from strict universality.
Reasons to Value History and the Scope of Cultural Heritage
Once we recognize that the extent to which value is personal or impersonal is best analyzed in terms of diverse reasons to value, we have new resources for clarifying the terms of disputes over object whose evaluative scope is contested. Instead of a stark contrast between the impersonal and the personal divided on the basis of which valuable things can be recognized from a detached perspective or which command respect, we have the diverse array of reasons to value (and to whom and how they apply) with which to analyze competing claims regarding the scope of different valuable things. As noted above, the Reason to Value approach also allows us to account for the widely varied evaluative scope of different things whose values is not universal, in contrast with the all-or-nothing approach of traditional accounts. In this section, I
will briefly explore the practical implications of this account for determining the evaluative scope of history and cultural heritage. While it will no doubt still be difficult in certain cases to assess who has reason to value such things, the conditions surveyed in the previous section that can plausibly be deemed sufficient for grounding such reasons should allow us to make some headway in tackling these cases. I do not claim to resolve this difficult issue here, but simply to demonstrate the advantages of approaching it with the more comprehensive accounts of impersonal value and evaluative scope that I have presented.
Consider two opposing views about the evaluative scope of cultural heritage. The
Universalist claims that cultural heritage has impersonal value in the sense that everyone has reason to value it. The Particularist claims that the value of cultural heritage is particular to specific groups, and is thus more like personal value. 44 The impersonal perspective is ill suited to this persists as a potential problem for "stewardship" models of archaeology, even though they get away from the concept of property altogether: "The impulse inherent in the concept of stewardship is to seek some reference point, some foundation that transcends local, individual interests on which to base its claims," which in the context of archeology, tends to evince itself in appeal to a "panhuman interest in a particular kind of knowledge about the cultural past." 48 To avoid this problem, Wylie contends that stewardship "must be construed not as a matter of wise management on behalf of an abstract higher interest (that of science and, by extension, society or humanity) but as a matter of collaborative, negotiated co-management among divergent interests (including archeological interests) none of which can be presumed, at the outset, to take precedence over the others."
49
These considerations should remind us that historical significance is dependent upon a broad, non-historical context of interests and concerns. As Arthur Danto writes: "a particular thing or occurrence acquires historical significance in virtue of its relations to some other thing or occurrence in which we happen to have some special interest, or to which we attach some importance, for whatever reason." 50 The archeological concern with extracting knowledge from historical artifacts is certainly justified by a range of human interests, including the importance to us of explanation and understanding. But these concerns are of a largely different kind from the sentimental attachments associated with the historical significance of, for example, family heirlooms and cherished places. One does not typically aim to learn anything about the past from a family heirloom, as its significance is understood in a non- about cultural heritage consists in its varied modes of historical significance, grounded in, among other things, both a concern with knowledge and a concern with personal attachment.
51
As one might expect, the sentimental valuing 52 of cultural heritage, the mode of valuation pertaining to personal attachment, tends to be associated with a particularist analysis that is more specific to certain groups. 53 It is worth pausing to focus on the kind of experience that this mode of valuation involves. It is not for nothing that we call the objects to which we have particular attachments objects of sentimental value: the emotions figure centrally in this mode of valuation.
As Scheffler notes, valuing in general seems to involve (among other things) being susceptible to a range of emotions, which will vary depending on the thing that is valued. 54 In the case of sentimental value, these might include pride, nostalgia, fondness, or just being verklempt.
Scheffler, as is common, associates sentimental value with personal value, understood as something "being valuable only to him or herself." 55 However, the character of the experience of sentimental value suggests a mode of valuation that can transcend the circumstances of a single 51 In addition to sentimental value, Wylie also mentions aesthetic and commercial value. Commercial value is instrumental, and aesthetic value strikes me (perhaps idealistically) as intuitively universal. I focus here on sentimental value as offering the most plausible rallying point for the particularist. There is no doubt more to be said about the role of political sovereignty in this debate as well, but there is insufficient space to address it here. For further discussion of kinds of historical value had by archaeological objects, see James O. The emotions associated with sentimental value might be described as involving a general feeling of belonging. 57 Objects of sentimental value tend to feel like ours even if we don't technically own them. Think of former students returning to high school to hang out on their bench, or a softball team that likes to go to their bar after the game. Even long after the bar is gone, they might walk by and say "this is where our bar used to be." Moreover, we often feel like we belong in places of sentimental value. This is part and parcel of the sense in which they belong to us. What makes the bar feel like theirs is that they feel at home there. It is no wonder, then, that sentimental value is essentially historical in nature: we don't get sentimental about new things or places because they don't yet belong to us, or us to them. It takes time to develop that kind of relationship. 58 56 I thus diverge from the personal analysis of sentimental value suggested by Hatzimoysis, "Sentimental Value." However, this is largely because Hatzimoysis seems to adopt the Impersonal Perspective account of impersonal value that I have questioned in this essay, claiming "sentimental value is personal because it is not impersonal, since it is part of a phenomenon that involves a point of view of the world." However, I think Hatzimoysis is right to note that "an object is sentimentally valuable to an agent for certain reasons, which, by the very fact of being reasons, are in principle intelligible by everyone else," though, as I have suggested above, wrong to conclude with "even though they are not applicable to anyone else." These reasons can indeed be applicable to others who stand in the relevant relations to the valued objects: these are cases of positional valuing described in the previous section. 57 Compare Cohen, "Rescuing Conservatism," 223. 58 Compare Scheffler's remarks about carving out a space in time in "The Normativity of Tradition." Also, see Raz: "Meaning comes through a common history, and through work." Value, Respect, and Attachment, 20.
I suspect that this fundamental aspect of sentimental value might help explain the extent of the tensions over the evaluative scope of cultural heritage. Although the sense of belonging at the heart of sentimental valuing is in one way weaker than the legal sense because it lacks the rights and privileges that we associate with legal ownership, it is in another sense stronger: the deed to a house may be taken away, or a car repossessed, but these alterations in legal status do nothing to affect the historical sense in which it is still his house, or her car. Indeed, the strength of "historical ownership," in contrast with the legal variety, can be a primary impetus for one's desire to reestablish legal ownership: one retains the strong sense in which the object is still one's possession, and one wants to regain the rights and privileges afforded by legal ownership, as well as the public recognition and respect that attends such status.
Recall that our question is "Who has reason to value cultural heritage?" with the universalists saying everyone and the particularist saying only specific groups. But notice that the universalists don't have to be right for the particularists to be wrong. It may be that there are in fact few, if any, things with non-moral value that everyone has reason to engage with.
However, all it takes to defeat the particularist claim is for it to be true that the reasons for valuing cultural heritage need not depend in a necessary way on the kind of local context that they claim it does (i.e. ancestry, birth-place, upbringing, cultural knowledge, etc.). And I think that in most cases they need not.
However, return to our paradigm object of personal value: What makes it the case that I have reason to value my grandfather's ring, but you do not? The obvious answer is that the historical features of the ring that make it significant (having belonged to my grandfather) simply are not relevant to you: it would make no sense if you valued the ring for that reason. Indeed, as far as you're concerned, the ring shouldn't seem significant at all, at least no more than any other geography, citizenship, academic study, and personal identification may all be sufficient (though not individually necessary) conditions for having reason to value cultural heritage, and there are few expanses of time that we cannot relate to in one of these ways. 63 Thus we can potentially make sense of the impersonal value of cultural heritage even when its universality is achieved through an overlapping plurality of reasons. This is the pluralistic universalism made possible by In a larger context, I hope to have shown that traditional accounts of impersonal value have been in need of revision. I have argued that attention to the reasons we have to value things is essential to our best understanding of value, which moreover allows for a more nuanced approach to understanding the evaluative scope of different things. My hope is that further investigation into this dimension of our evaluative lives will yield fruitful results, not just in the study of our relationship to the past, but also in the many other areas of moral and political philosophy where disputes about the scope of value, and the things that possess it, often arise.
